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GIMME THAT OL’ TIME SEPARATION: 
A REVIEW ESSAY 
Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church 
and State 
Francis J. Beckwith* 
The United States Constitution addresses religion in only 
two places. First, Article VI states that “no religious Test shall 
ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust”1  
Second, the First Amendment contains a sequence of words that 
many Americans can recite by memory:  “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof.”2  The phrase “separation of church and 
state” has often been employed as a shorthand way to describe 
the legal principles that many believe are the basis for the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.  However, the 
language is notoriously vague, for it gives us no direction as to 
the precise meaning of “free exercise,” “establishment,” or even 
“religion.”3 
It is clear, though, from the text that the First Amendment 
was intended solely to limit the law-making power of Congress 
and not any other branch of the state or federal governments.  
But since the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court, in a 
piecemeal fashion, began applying the First Amendment to all 
governments in the United States.4  For example, in 1947, in 
 
* Associate Professor of Church-State Studies, and Associate Director of the J. M. Dawson 
Institute of Church-State Studies, Baylor University.  Ph.D. (philosophy), M.A. 
(philosophy), Fordham University; M.J.S. (Master of Juridical Studies), Washington 
University School of Law, St. Louis. 
 1 U.S. CONST. art.VI cl. 3. 
 2 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 3 Id. 
 4 The Court first incorporated the Freedom of Speech and Press Clauses, eventually 
incorporating the entire First Amendment.  See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 
(1925) (stating that freedom of speech and press “are among the fundamental personal 
rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
from impairment by the States”); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (“It is no 
longer open to doubt that the liberty of the press and of speech is within the liberty 
safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by 
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Everson v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court applied the 
Establishment Clause to a non-federal government. 5  The Court’s 
justification was a theory of constitutional interpretation known 
as the incorporation doctrine.6  The Fourteenth Amendment 
states that no citizen may be deprived of “life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”7  Thus, according to the 
Supreme Court and many constitutional scholars, many of the 
guarantees found in the Bill of Rights, including the religion 
clauses found in the First Amendment, apply to the States in 
addition to the federal government.8  Whether such a move is 
justified is outside the scope of this review.  Regardless, 
Americans have grown so accustomed to thinking of their 
Federal Constitutional rights as restraints on all governments – 
federal, state, and local – that even a logically sound argument 
against incorporation is not likely to get very far.9 
 
state action.”); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (“The right of peaceable 
assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally 
fundamental.”); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“The First Amendment 
declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.  The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the 
legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.”); Everson v. Bd. 
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (agreeing 9-0 that the Establishment Clause applies to the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 5 330 U.S. at 15-18. 
 6 Id. at 8.  For an explanation of the incorporation doctrine, see Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1963): 
[T]his Court has looked to the fundamental nature of original Bill of Rights 
guarantees to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment makes them 
obligatory on the States.  Explictly recognized to be of this “fundamental 
nature” and therefore made immune from state invasion by the Fourteenth, or 
some part of it, are the First Amendment’s freedoms of speech, press, religion, 
assembly, association, and petition for redress of grievances. 
Id. at 341 (emphasis added). 
 7 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 8 There are disagreements among jurists as to what aspects or provisions of the Bill 
of Rights should be incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Doug Linder, 
The Incorporation Debate, at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/ 
incorp.htm (last visited May 1, 2005). 
 9 See, e.g., Elk Grove v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 2328 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
Justice Thomas writes: 
Because I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that respondent Newdow has 
standing, I would take this opportunity to begin the process of rethinking the 
Establishment Clause.  I would acknowledge that the Establishment Clause is 
a federalism provision, which, for this reason, resists incorporation.  Moreover, 
as I will explain, the Pledge policy is not implicated by any sensible 
incorporation of the Establishment Clause, which would probably cover little 
more than the Free Exercise Clause. 
Id. at 2328 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
  According to Justice Thomas, the Establishment Clause was intended to be a limit 
on federal power by forbidding the federal government to establish a national church 
while permitting each state to establish a state church if it desired.  Id. at 2330.  Thus, 
because it was not intended to protect any individual liberty relative to the federal 
government, it cannot be incorporated through the “liberty” referred to in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Id. at 2331.  One could add to Justice Thomas’ analysis that, given the 
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The notion of “separation of church and state” is a largely 
unquestioned dogma in American political and legal discourse 
even though the phrase does not appear in the text of the 
Constitution.  A plain reading of the religion clauses is just as 
consistent with some forms of moderate separationism as it is 
with strong separationism.10  In his masterful work entitled 
Separation of Church and State, Philip Hamburger demonstrates 
that separationism has achieved its status in American politics 
and jurisprudence largely as a result of an ignoble pedigree, 
which harnessed an ambiguously understood slogan – separation 
of church and state – to advance a particular view of religion, 
state, and liberty, which its proponents consider to be the 
“American Way.”11 
I. STORY OF A SLOGAN 
Hamburger, who is the John P. Wilson Professor of Law at 
the University of Chicago, divides his book into four sections: 
Late Eighteenth-Century Religious Liberty; Early Nineteenth-
Century Republicanism; Mid-Nineteenth-Century Americanism; 
and Late Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Constitutional 
Law. Hamburger tells the story of a slogan, which was famously 
employed by Thomas Jefferson in his Letter to the Danbury 
Baptists: 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between 
Man & his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his 
worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, 
& not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the 
whole American people which declared that their legislature should 
 
Establishment Clause’s original purpose, an incorporation of the Clause through the 
Fourteenth Amendment would technically entail that the state, like the federal 
government, may not establish a religion.  A local government, however, would be able to 
establish a religion, just as the states were able to do prior to incorporation. 
 10 Although it is difficult to precisely define the difference between moderate 
separationism and strong separationism, it seems to me that the following is a fair 
distinction.  First, both affirm that the government should maximize religious liberty 
consistent with the public good and prohibit both ecclesiastical control of government 
powers and government control of ecclesiastical powers.  Second, moderate separationism 
does not attempt to marginalize religion in public life, and, for example, would support 
public funding programs for similarly-situated religious and secular entities.  On the 
other hand, strong separationism forbids any direct aid to religion, even when similarly 
situated secular entities are given aid.  In addition, strong separationists seem willing to 
marginalize the political proposals of religious citizens if those proposals are religiously 
motivated, though similarly-situated non-religious citizens offering proposals based on 
secular grounds are unlikely to suffer the same fate.  See Thomas C. Berg, Anti-
Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 121, 122 n.5 (2001); 
Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43 
(1997); Carl H. Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid Separationism and 
the Establishment Clause, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 285 (1999). 
 11 See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (Paperback 
ed. 2004). 
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“make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof,” thus building a wall of separation between 
Church & State.12 
Because Jefferson is one of America’s Founding Fathers, this 
letter, which Jefferson wrote while President, has the status of a 
sacred text in separationist circles.  In fact, among some 
Christian church-state separationists, Jefferson’s Letter to the 
Danbury Baptists carries with it an authority not unlike Paul’s 
Letter to the Galatians.  And yet, Jefferson’s letter is, after all, a 
type of communication that presidents produce at least several 
times a day to a wide range of constituencies.  Given that, it 
seems somewhat dubious to base constitutional doctrine on what 
amounts to nothing more than a note to political allies seeking 
the president’s support for their religious liberty.  This note was 
not part of an executive order, proposed legislation, or even a 
directive offered by the president to the attorney general as a 
suggested way to interpret the Establishment Clause.  It is not 
clear, therefore, why one should take Jefferson’s letter to the 
Baptists as any more normative for constitutional interpretation 
as, for example, Ronald Reagan’s published book defending the 
pro-life position on abortion.13  After all, Reagan, as California’s 
governor, signed into law one of the first statutes that 
significantly liberalized access to abortion.14  Thus, because the 
California law pre-dated Roe v. Wade15 by six years, Governor 
Reagan was, in reality, one of legalized abortion’s “founding 
fathers,” and thus perhaps possessed a special insight into the 
issue’s jurisprudence. 
Hamburger points out that Jefferson’s letter embodied a 
particular understanding of the relationship between church and 
state that was not shared by the Danbury Baptists.16  Rather, the 
 
 12 Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802), 57 THE 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS INFORMATION BULLETIN 6 (June 1998), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html  (last visited May 1, 2005). 
 13 RONALD W. REAGAN, ABORTION AND THE CONSCIENCE OF THE NATION (1984). 
 14 See Carole Joffe, 30 Years After Roe v. Wade: Lessons about Abortion from the San 
Francisco Nine, at http://www.prochoiceforum.org.uk/ocrabortlaw6.asp (Jan. 2003).  She 
writes:  
The case [of the San Francisco Nine] reverberated in California and across the 
nation.  In California, it gave new momentum to a bill, previously introduced in 
the legislature, that reformers had designed to broaden the grounds on which 
abortion would be legally permitted in the state.  In 1967 this law passed, and 
a reluctant Governor Ronald Reagan signed the California Therapeutic 
Abortion Act. 
Id. 
 15 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 16 According to Hamburger, “Jefferson’s letter was not entirely a declaration of 
liberty.  Separation was an idea first introduced into American politics by Jefferson’s 
allies, the Republicans, who used it to elicit popular distaste against Federalist clergymen 
in their exercise of their religious freedom.”  HAMBURGER, supra note 11, at 109-10.  For 
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Danbury Baptists were known as dissenters – those who opposed 
religious establishment but did not oppose the influence of 
religion on government.17  In fact, because it was assumed that 
the moral ecology of a society could not be maintained without 
the influence of religion, dissenters had to constantly deal with 
the false charge that they were really separationists wanting to 
remove any vestiges of religion from the public square.  As 
Hamburger points out, that was why the “Baptists who sought 
the support of the president were . . . silent about his 
letter . . . .”18  Jefferson’s letter, in fact, would have been 
counterproductive in quelling the fears of those who equated 
anti-establishment with separationism.19  According to 
Hamburger, “Baptists merely sought disestablishment and did 
not challenge the widespread assumption that republican 
government depended upon the people’s morals and thus upon 
religion.”20 
The Danbury Baptists, like most Americans at the time, 
maintained that the church and state were two separate spheres.  
However, they believed that the church, like other non-
government institutions, played a vital role in civilizing the 
nation’s citizens.  In addition, they noted that the church 
instilled in citizens the notion that their rights were not derived 
from the fiat of governments, but were stamped on them by their 
Creator.  The Baptists believed that the role of government was 
to protect the people’s God-given rights, whereas the role of 
religion was to shape the moral understanding of the nation’s 
people in order that they might be upstanding citizens.21 
According to this view, the United States of America is a 
constitutional republic whose institutions presuppose and entail 
certain beliefs about the order and nature of things.  These 
beliefs are nonnegotiable and necessary to maintain the 
continuity and purpose of the nation, including the rights of its 
people and the powers of its governments (both state and 
federal).  The philosophical infrastructure of the American 
Republic consists of a cluster of ideals, beliefs, practices, and 
 
the Federalist clergy had “inveighed against Jefferson, often from their pulpits, 
excoriating his infidelity and deism.”  Id. at 111.  Although “[t]he religious dissenters, 
including the Baptists, sympathized with the Republicans and distrusted the Federalists, 
particularly the Federalist clergy. Yet, when invited by Jefferson to join the Republican 
demand for separation, the Baptists quietly declined.”  Id. at 110. 
 17 HAMBURGER, supra note 11, at 163-80. 
 18 Id. at 165. 
 19 Hamburger notes that: “[I]t may be useful to begin by considering [the Baptists’] 
awkward situation. . . .  [E]stablishment ministers had long accused dissenters of 
advocating separation, whether of church from state or religion from government.” Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See generally HAMBURGER, supra note 11. 
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institutions that are best sustained by a people who see this 
cluster as grounded in certain unchanging moral truths that are 
religious in nature. 
Although the New Testament speaks very little about 
government and the Christian’s responsibility as a citizen, there 
is one particular passage that may illuminate this Early 
American understanding.  Jesus, in a familiar scene, is 
confronted by the Pharisees with an apparent dilemma: 
“Tell us, then, what is your opinion:  Is it lawful to pay the census tax 
to Caesar or not?”  Knowing their malice, Jesus said, “Why are you 
testing me, you hypocrites?  Show me the coin that pays the census 
tax.”  Then they handed him the Roman coin.  He said to them, 
“Whose image is this and whose inscription?”  They replied, 
“Caesar’s.”  At that he said to them, “Then repay to Caesar what 
belongs to Caesar and to God what belongs to God.”  When they heard 
this they were amazed, and leaving him they went away.  22 
Generally, “[t]he dominant understanding of this passage is 
that Jesus was instructing His audience that the church and 
government have jurisdiction over different spheres of 
authority.”23  As I have previously expressed: 
I believe this understanding is largely correct; however, those who 
present it often miss the subtle and political implications of what 
Jesus said.  He asked whose image was on the coin.  The answer was, 
of course, Caesar’s.  There is, however, an unsaid question that begs to 
be answered: What or who has the image of God on it?  If the coin 
under the authority of Caesar because it bore his image, then we are 
under the authority of God because we bear His image.  Good 
governments, nevertheless, ought to be concerned with the well-being 
of their citizens, and these citizens correctly believe that their well-
being is best sustained by a just government.  It follows that both 
government and church, though having separate jurisdictions, share a 
common obligation to advance the well-being of those who bear God’s 
image. 24 
Given this understanding, the Danbury Baptists were 
troubled that their state, Connecticut, levied a tax to support the 
state’s established religion: Congregationalism.  Although 
Connecticut did allow Baptists and other citizens to request that 
the state redirect their tax money to their own churches, the 
process required that “they first. . .obtain, fill out, and properly 
 
 22 Matthew 22:11-13 (New American Bible). 
 23 Francis J. Beckwith, Wise as Serpents: Christians, Politics & Strategic Voting, 27 
CHRISTIAN RESEARCH JOURNAL 3, 52-53 (2004) at 
http://homepage.mac.com/francis.beckwith/WiseAsSerpents.html (original manuscript on 
file with author) [hereinafter Beckwith, Wise as Serpents]. 
 24 Id. (citation omitted). 
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file an exemption certificate.”25  And because “Baptists were a 
harassed minority, some communities made it difficult for them 
to receive these exemptions,”26 which is why they shared their 
complaint with President Jefferson.  However, like many 
Americans at the time, the Danbury Baptists did not see their 
resistance to religious establishment as inconsistent with a 
government that accommodates, and even encourages, its people 
to embrace an account of rights and human institutions in which 
religion, and its moral instruction, is essential.27 
II. ANTI-CATHOLIC PREJUDICE AND THE TRIUMPH OF 
SEPARATIONISM 
In the nineteenth century, separationism surged to 
prominence, largely as a Protestant reaction against the influx of 
immigrants from predominantly Roman Catholic countries.  
Some of these immigrant groups, including Irish and Italians, 
had set up their own private religious schools.  However, many 
non-Catholic Americans believed that Catholic schools 
indoctrinated students with superstitions that were inconsistent 
with the principles of American democracy.28  Therefore, in order 
to make sure that such schools would not receive government 
funding of any sort, federal and state legislation was proposed 
that forbade the use of public resources for religious, e.g. 
 
 25 Derek H. Davis, Thomas Jefferson and the “Wall Of Separation” Metaphor, 45 J. 
CHURCH & STATE 5, 10 (2003). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Of course, establishment supporters saw anti-establishment dissenters as no 
different than separationists. See HAMBURGER, supra note 11, at 65-78. 
 28 Take, for example, these comments by Joseph Martin Dawson: 
The Catholics, who [in 1948] are claiming a near majority over all Protestants 
in the United States, would abolish our public school system which is our 
greatest single factor in national unity and would substitute their old-world, 
medieval parochial schools with their alien culture.  Or else they make it plain 
that they wish to install facilities for teaching their religion in the public 
schools. 
. . . . 
Perhaps the burning issue has arisen soon enough to enable the friends of the 
native American culture to arrest the progress of the long-range plan of those 
who would supplant it.  There can be no doubt about the Catholic plan.  Having 
lost enormous prestige in Europe, the Church now looks to the United States 
as a suitable stage for the recovery of its lost influence.  Here it would seek new 
ground, consolidate and expand, as compensation for its weakened position in 
bankrupt Europe, with the hope of transforming this continent, a Protestant 
country, into a Catholic citadel from which to exert a more powerful rule.  If 
this seems exaggerated and fanciful, the reader has only to open his eyes to 
what the Catholics are doing to achieve this end. 
JOSEPH MARTIN DAWSON, SEPARATE CHURCH AND STATE NOW 98-100 (1948).  Special 
thanks to the Rev. Dawson’s granddaughter, Alice Baird, for bringing this book to my 
attention in her personal correspondence with me. (Personal correspondence on file with 
author). 
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Catholic, purposes.  The most ambitious attempt to put this 
sentiment into law was the so-called “Blaine Amendment,”29 
which was named after the Congressman who proposed it.30  
Although it never became part of the Constitution, some 
individual states passed Blaine-type statutes or constitutional 
amendments that still remain on the books.31 
Hamburger astutely points out that by arguing there was a 
need for these amendments, supporters of the Blaine 
Amendment and its progeny implicitly conceded that the First 
Amendment’s Establishment Clause, by itself, does not prohibit 
the use of public resources for religious purposes.32  Of course, 
this would mean that separationist jurisprudence relying on a 
Blaine-type understanding of church and state is likely an 
improper reading of the First Amendment.  This does not mean, 
of course, that some modest form of separationism, such as the 
traditional anti-establishment position of the Danbury Baptists, 
is not correct (as I believe is, in fact, the case).  Rather, it means 
that a doctrine borne of anti-Catholic animus and a desire to 
declare an American Protestant hegemony as the established 
understanding of public faith is hardly the “neutral” and 
“separationist” creed its proponents have led us to believe. 
Ironically, as Hamburger points out, the underlying 
principles of separationism were adopted in the twentieth 
century by secularists, who were hostile to all religion in public 
life.33  They used these principles to eliminate some of the most 
cherished practices of many (though not all) nineteenth century 
Anti-Catholic Protestant Separationists, including prayer34 and 
Bible-reading in public schools.35  These separationist principles 
were eventually applied by jurists and scholars to laws reflecting 
 
 29 The proposed amendment text reads: 
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any 
State for the support of public schools, or derived from any public fund 
therefor, nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control 
of any religious sect, nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be 
divided between religious sects or denominations. 
4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875). 
 30 James G. Blaine was a Republican Congressman from Maine.  Biographical 
Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-Present, at 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=B000519 (last visited May 1, 
2005).    
 31 For example, the Constitution of Texas states: “No money shall be appropriated, 
or drawn from the Treasury for the benefit of any sect, or religious society, theological or 
religious seminary; nor shall property belonging to the State be appropriated for any such 
purposes.”  TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 7. 
 32 HAMBURGER, supra note 11, at 296-312. 
 33 Id. at 478. 
 34 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38 (1985). 
 35 See Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963). 
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traditional moral understandings on abortion36 and 
homosexuality,37 as well as to the idea that just government and 
constitutional jurisprudence both presuppose that we can know 
and apply unchanging moral truths.38 
 
 36 Justice John Paul Stevens, for example, offers the following analysis of a Missouri 
statute that placed restrictions on abortion and included a preamble that asserted that 
human life begins at conception: 
Indeed, I am persuaded that the absence of any secular purpose for the 
legislative declarations that life begins at conception and that conception 
occurs at fertilization makes the relevant portion of the preamble invalid under 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution.  
This conclusion does not, and could not, rest on the fact that the statement 
happens to coincide with the tenets of certain religions . . . or on the fact that 
the legislators who voted to enact it may have been motivated by religious 
considerations. . . .Rather, it rests on the fact that the preamble, an 
unequivocal endorsement of a religious tenet of some but by no means all 
Christian faiths, serves no identifiable secular purpose.  That fact alone 
compels a conclusion that the statute violates the Establishment Clause. 
. . . . 
As a secular matter, there is an obvious difference between the state interest in 
protecting the freshly fertilized egg and the state interest in protecting a 9-
month-gestated, fully sentient fetus on the eve of birth.  There can be no 
interest in protecting the newly fertilized egg from physical pain or mental 
anguish, because the capacity for such suffering does not yet exist; respecting a 
developed fetus, however, that interest is valid. 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 566-67, 569 (1989) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations and footnotes omitted).  Justice 
Stevens’ judgment that there is no prima facie wrong in killing a pre-sentient human 
being because she is not yet sentient is curious.  What Justice Stevens should have done 
is provide an argument as to why full sentience is the property a human being must 
possess in order for the law to be justified in recognizing it as a being worthy of legal 
protection.  Stipulation just doesn’t cut it. 
 37 E.g., in his dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, Justice Stevens writes: 
Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear.  First, the fact that 
the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice 
as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the 
practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting 
miscegenation from constitutional attack.  Second, individual decisions by 
married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even 
when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of “liberty” protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Moreover, this protection 
extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons. 
478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations and footnote omitted). 
  In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court embraced Justice Stevens’ reasoning in a holding 
that overturned Bowers and concluded that homosexual sodomy is a protected liberty 
under the Fourteenth Amendment:  “Justice STEVENS’ analysis, in our view, should 
have been controlling in Bowers and should control here.”  539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 38 For example, separationist law professor Steven G. Gey writes: 
The establishment clause should be viewed as a reflection of the secular, 
relativist political values of the Enlightenment, which are incompatible with 
the fundamental nature of religious faith.  As an embodiment of these 
Enlightenment values, the establishment clause requires that the political 
influence of religion be substantially diminished. . . . Religious belief and 
practice should be protected under the first amendment, but only to the same 
extent and for the same reason that all other forms of expression and 
conscience are protected – because the first amendment prohibits government 
from enacting into law any religious, political, or aesthetic orthodoxy. 
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As America moved into the twentieth century, separationism 
was increasingly perceived as the American understanding of the 
Establishment Clause.  Among its most vocal and public 
advocates were Baptists, Freemasons, the Ku Klux Klan, 
Nativists, and Secularists.  One of the most ardent separationists 
of the twentieth century, Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, 
was a Baptist and Freemason and, up until about ten years prior 
to his 1937 nomination to the Court, a member of the Ku Klux 
Klan.  Although, as Hamburger points out, Black, “[i]n later 
years, would discount his association with the Invisible Empire of 
the Ku Klux Klan” as an innocent membership in a fraternal 
 
. . . . 
[R]eligious principles are not based on logic or reason, and, therefore, may not 
be proved or disproved. 
. . . . 
Whereas religion asserts that its principles are immutable and absolutely 
authoritative, democratic theory asserts just the opposite.  The sine qua non of 
any democratic state is that everything political is open to question; not only 
specific policies and programs, but the very structure of the state itself must 
always be subject to challenge.  Democracies are by nature inhospitable to 
political or intellectual stasis or certainty.  Religion is fundamentally 
incompatible with this intellectual cornerstone of the modern democratic state.  
The irreconcilable distinction between democracy and religion is that, although 
there can be no sacrosanct principles or unquestioned truths in a democracy, 
no religion can exist without sacrosanct principles and unquestioned truths. 
Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion 
Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 79, 167, 174 
(Fall 1990). 
  Aside from raising the awkward question of whether the claim that “no religion 
can exist without sacrosanct principles and unquestioned truths” is an unquestioned 
truth about which Professor Gey is certain, one may consult the following responses to the 
sort of “reasoning” he is offering his readers. See generally Mark Fisher, The Sacred and 
the Secular: An Examination of the “Wall of Separation” and Its Impact on the Religious 
World View, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 325 (Fall 1992); HADLEY ARKES, FIRST THINGS: AN 
INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND JUSTICE (1986); HADLEY ARKES, 
NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE (2002); FRANCIS J. BECKWITH & GREGORY P. 
KOUKL, RELATIVISM: FEET FIRMLY PLANTED IN MID-AIR (1998); C. S. LEWIS, MERE 
CHRISTIANITY (1952); Robert P. George, Public Reason and Political Conflict: Abortion and 
Homosexuality, 106 YALE L.J. 2475, 2486-95 (1997); and Ronald Dworkin, Darwin’s New 
Bulldog, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1718 (1998). 
  Because Gey does not interact with any of the relevant literature on religious 
belief, morality, and rationality, it is difficult to know how he would reply to the 
sophisticated and/or compelling arguments offered by members of the growing intellectual 
movement of theistic philosophers in North America and Britain.  Among the works that 
include these arguments are numerous books that were published before 1990 (the year 
Gey’s article appeared in print).  They include the following:  RICHARD SWINBURNE, THE 
EXISTENCE OF GOD (1979); RICHARD SWINBURNE, FAITH AND REASON (1981); FAITH & 
RATIONALITY: REASON & BELIEF IN GOD (Alvin Plantinga & Nicholas Wolterstorff eds., 
1983); WILLIAM LANE CRAIG, THE KALAM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT (1979); ALVIN 
PLANTINGA, GOD AND OTHER MINDS: A STUDY OF THE RATIONAL JUSTIFICATION OF BELIEF 
IN GOD (1967); J. P. MORELAND, SCALING THE SECULAR CITY (1987); JOHN FINNIS, 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); JOHN FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 
(1983); MORTIMER ADLER, TEN PHILOSOPHICAL MISTAKES (1985); MORTIMER ADLER, HOW 
TO THINK ABOUT GOD: A GUIDE  FOR THE 20TH CENTURY PAGAN (1980). 
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organization, “Black’s account of his participat[ion] in the Klan 
was, at best, understated.”39  Hamburger presents a detailed 
history of Black’s Klan affiliation which leaves no doubt that 
Black was much more than a nominal Klansman who wore his 
sheets only on holidays and for weddings.40  According to 
Hamburger, “[i]n September 1923, Black joined the powerful 
Richard E. Lee Klan No. 1 and promptly became Kladd of his 
Klavern [which meant that he was] the officer who initiated new 
members by administering the oath about ‘white supremacy’ and 
‘separation of church and state.’”41  Apparently, to quote the 
comedian Dennis Miller, Black was “burning the cross at both 
ends!”42 
According to Hamburger, by the time the U. S. Supreme 
Court applied the Establishment Clause to the states in Everson, 
the separationist understanding was so widely accepted 
throughout the country that the Court could make it a fixed point 
in constitutional law without the need for any Blaine-type 
amendment.43  And the Court did so in Everson, whose majority 
opinion was penned by Justice Black.44  The case concerned the 
question of whether the Township of Ewing, New Jersey’s 
payment to parents for the busing of their children to Catholic 
parochial schools, violated the Establishment Clause. Black 
concluded that it did not because (1) the payment was not given 
directly to a religious organization; (2) the payment was available 
to children in all schools, including non-religious private schools; 
and (3) it was much like other public services, such as the police 
and fire department.45  Although many of Black’s separationist 
allies on and off the Court – four of his brethren dissented 46 – did 
not like the fact that the Township of Ewing won the lawsuit, 
they would in coming years, upon reflection, realize that Black 
had delicately and cleverly placed into the arsenal of 
constitutional law adjudication, for the first time, the principles 
of separationism.  Black wrote: 
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means 
at least this:  Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a 
 
 39 HAMBURGER, supra note 11, at 423-24. 
 40 Id. at 422-34. 
 41 Id. at 426. 
 42 Joe Kovacs, “Dennis Miller jabs Democrat all-stars,” WorldNetDaily, at 
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=34524 (last visited May 1, 
2005) (talking about Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV), another former member of the Ku Klux 
Klan). 
 43 HAMBURGER, supra note 11, at 455. 
 44 330 U.S. at 3-18. 
 45 Id. at 6, 17-18. 
 46 Id. at 18-63.  Justices Jackson, Rutledge, Frankfurter, and Burton dissented from 
Justice Black’s majority opinion. 
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church.  Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, 
or prefer one religion over another.  Neither can force nor influence a 
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force 
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.  No person can be 
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, 
for church attendance or non-attendance.  No tax in any amount, large 
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or 
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever from they may 
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any 
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of 
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was 
intended to erect “a wall of separation between Church and State.”47 
Hamburger writes that Black “understood what he was 
doing.  Only ten years before, when Black was appointed to the 
Court, Catholics vociferously condemned him for his Klan 
membership.”48  Thus, the facts and circumstances of Everson 
afforded Black “an opportunity to make separation the 
unanimous standard of the Court while reaching a judgment that 
would undercut Catholic criticism.”49  A fellow Baptist and 
separationist ally of Black’s, the Reverend Joseph Martin 
Dawson, the namesake of the institute in which I hold my 
academic appointment, began to understand this as well.  In 
commenting on the Everson case in his autobiography, he wrote, 
“We had lost a battle, but won the war!”50 
Despite this victory, and a few subsequent ones for the 
separationists,51 the Supreme Court has not fully absorbed the 
 
 47 Id. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)). 
 48 HAMBURGER, supra note 11, at 461-62. 
 49 Id. at 462. 
 50 Id. at 462.  See also JOSEPH MARTIN DAWSON, A THOUSAND MONTHS TO 
REMEMBER: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 194 (1964) (citing the same sentence).  It should be noted 
that the Rev. Dawson never shared Justice Black’s affection for the Klan.  In fact, Dawson 
was a courageous opponent of racial prejudice.  He writes in graphic detail: 
The First Baptist Church upheld a free pulpit.  I denounced the Ku Klux Klan 
in face of nearly all in the church being members of the Klan.  I was most 
severe when the Klan’s mob lynched a Negro.  My resolutions adopted by the 
Waco Pastor’s Association are still being quoted around the country.  These 
resolutions had been written just after I had seen the mob drag the terror-
stricken Negro youth to the city hall square, seen the crazed mobsters toss him 
into the flames, in horror beheld them heap the faggots about his tortured 
body, gasped as they seized his torso, tied a rope around it to be hitched to the 
horn of a saddle for a so-called man to race with it hurtling on the ground to a 
creek bed in the country. 
DAWSON, supra note 28, at 165.  See also, James M. Dunn, The Ethical Thought of Joseph 
Martin Dawson 151-186 (1966) (unpublished Th.D. dissertation, Southwestern Baptist 
Theological Seminary) (on file with the Baylor University Church-State Research Center). 
 51 See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (holding that New York City’s use 
of federal funds to help underprivileged children, who attended  parochial schools and 
were in need of remedial reading and math, violated the Establishment Clause because of 
excessive entanglement.  The program involved the use of public school teachers, 
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premises of its jurisprudence. In fact, the contemporary Court 
seems to be moving in a direction more accommodating of 
religion, especially in the areas of religious speech and public 
funding of schools when the funds are directed to the schools by 
private choice or when there is no evidence that the funds are 
being used for indoctrination.52  There are exceptions, however, 
in free exercise cases involving states with Blaine-type laws.53 
III. TAKING HAMBURGER SERIOUSLY 
By making a convincing case that there are good historical 
 
although no religious symbols in the classrooms or religious indoctrination in the 
students’ lessons were allowed), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997).  
See also Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (issued the same day as 
Aguilar and involved similar issues that led the Court to strike down two school district 
programs on Establishment Clause grounds based on excessive entanglement), overruled 
in part by Agostini, 521 U.S. at 236 (overruling the aspect of Ball pertaining to the 
“Shared Time” program). 
 52 See Widmer v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (finding that a religious student 
group’s free speech and association rights were violated when it was prohibited by a state 
university from meeting on campus); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. 
Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (ruling that it does not violate the Establishment Clause for a 
public school district to permit a church to show, after school hours and on school 
property, a religiously-oriented film on family life); Zobrest v. Catalina, 509 U.S. 1 (1993) 
(ruling that a school district may not refuse to supply a sign-language interpreter to a 
student at a religious high school when such government benefits are neutrally dispensed 
to students without regard to the public-nonpublic or sectarian-nonsectarian nature of the 
school); Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (finding that it was 
content-based discrimination for the government to prohibit a controversial organization 
from sponsoring a religious display in a public park); Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S 819 
(1995) (ruling that it was a denial of college students’ free speech rights, as well as a risk 
of nurturing hostility toward religion, to prohibit the students from using student-funds 
for a religiously-oriented publication); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (finding that 
direct funding to private schools, including religious schools, does not violate the 
Establishment Clause, since the distribution is evenhanded and the use of the money to 
indoctrinate students in religious schools cannot reasonably be attributed to government); 
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 837-40, 867 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (finding that direct funding to 
private schools including religious schools does not violate the Establishment Clause, 
since the distribution is evenhanded and there is no evidence that funds given to religious 
schools were used to indoctrinate students). 
 53 See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004) (refusing to overturn 
Washington’s Blaine-type amendment on free exercise grounds)  In pertinent part, 
Washington’s Blaine-type amendment reads: “No public money or property shall be 
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the 
support of any religious establishment.”  Id. at 719 n.2 (quoting  WASH. CONST., art I, § 
11). The case concerned Joshua Davey, a theology student who qualified for a state 
scholarship, but was denied it on the grounds that Washington law forbade any funding 
for theological education, even though similarly situated students majoring in philosophy, 
history, or chemistry could make use of the same financial help.  Id. at 717, 721.  The 
Court held that states have much leeway in the area of funding, and that Washington 
could have a Blaine-type law without violating Mr. Davey’s free exercise rights.  Id. at 
721.  However, the flip-side of this “leeway” is that if Washington had funded Davey’s 
theology education it would not have violated the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 719.  So, 
contrary to conventional wisdom and the beliefs of some separationist groups, Locke was 
not a victory for separationism.  See also Witters v. Comm’n for the Blind, 771 P. 2d 1119 
(Wash. 1989). 
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and textual reasons not to equate separationism with anti-
establishment, Hamburger has provided a conceptual scheme by 
which courts may affirm the constitutionality of laws that are 
tied to religious understandings, but, nevertheless, do not 
constitute state establishments of religion.  In other words, a 
government within the United States may pass laws providing 
public approval and sustenance to moral understandings that are 
consistent with, congenial to, or have their grounding in certain 
religious traditions, and which, simultaneously, are thought to 
advance the public good without offending the First Amendment 
religion clauses.  Although not in line with the agenda of many 
contemporary separationists, such an approach would have been 
well-received by their anti-establishment predecessors, such as 
the Danbury Baptists, who believed in the importance of religion 
and morality in the preservation of a Constitutional Republic.54 
For example, consider the debate over abortion.  
Contemporary separationists generally support abortion rights 
on anti-establishment and/or free exercise grounds.55  They argue 
that the pro-life position on abortion, that the fetus is a full-
fledged member of the human community and is entitled to 
 
 54 As Daniel Dreisbach writes: 
Although no friend of religious establishments, many evangelical dissenters 
resisted efforts to inhibit religion’s ability to influence public life and culture, 
to deprive religious leaders of the civil liberty to participate in politics armed 
with political opinions informed by religious values, and to restrain the 
freedom of churches to define and advance their own mission and ministries, 
whether spiritual, social, or civic. 
DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN 
CHURCH AND STATE 52 (2002).  Concerning the era in which President Jefferson penned 
his letter to the Danbury Baptists, Hamburger writes: 
In all probability, therefore, only a handful of Baptists, if any, and no Baptist 
organizations made separation their demand.  Instead, Baptists focused on 
other, more traditional, claims of religious liberty. 
What Baptists sought not only differed from separation of church and state but 
also conflicted with it.  Tactically, dissenters could not afford to demand 
separation, for a potent argument against them had been that they denied the 
connection between religion and government – a serious charge in a society in 
which religion was widely understood to be the necessary foundation of 
morality and government. 
HAMBURGER, supra note 11, at 177-78. 
 55 See, e.g., PETER S. WENZ, ABORTION RIGHTS AS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1992); Paul 
D. Simmons, Religious Liberty and Abortion Policy: Casey as “Catch-22”, 42 J. CHURCH & 
STATE 69 (2000) [hereinafter Simmons, Religious Liberty and Abortion Policy]; Paul D. 
Simmons, Religious Liberty and the Abortion Debate, 32 J. CHURCH & STATE 567 (1990); 
Stuart Rosenbaum, Abortion, the Constitution, and Metaphysics, 43 J. CHURCH & STATE 
707 (2001); Judith Jarvis Thomson, Abortion, 20 BOSTON REV. 11 (Summer 1995).  But cf. 
Francis J. Beckwith, Law, Religion and the Metaphysics of Abortion: A Reply to Simmons, 
43 J. CHURCH & STATE 19 (2001); Francis J. Beckwith, When You Come to a Fork in the 
Road, Take It?: Abortion, Personhood, and the Jurisprudence of Neutrality, 45 J. CHURCH 
& STATE 485 (2003).  Francis J. Beckwith, Thomson’s “Equal Reasonableness” Argument 
For Abortion Rights: A Critique, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 118 (2004). 
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constitutional protection from the moment of conception, depends 
on “[a]bstract metaphysical speculation.”56  Therefore, any law 
prohibiting abortion on pro-life grounds would either constitute 
the establishment of religion, and/or violate the Free Exercise 
Clause by impeding the right of a woman who wants to obtain an 
abortion because, under her religious convictions, a fetus is not 
entitled to any legal rights. 
Of course, it is no coincidence that opponents of abortion are 
generally more religious than those who support abortion-
choice.57  Opponents of abortion usually accept a view of the 
nature of the unborn that is consistent with their religion’s 
philosophical anthropology.58  However, those who offer this 
point of view in the public square do not merely stipulate the 
veracity of their position, as one would expect from people whose 
purpose is simply to propound dogmas condemning the 
“infidels.”59  Rather, they offer arguments consisting of reasoning 
that is remarkably public.60  These arguments are not extracted 
 
 56 Simmons, Religious Liberty and Abortion Policy, supra note 55, at 75.  Simmons 
writes: 
The fact that many people believe strongly that a zygote is a person is by now 
well established. The First Amendment allows people to believe as they will as 
a matter of conscience or religious belief.  That is a matter of freedom of 
religion.  But as a definition of personhood for constitutional protections in a 
pluralistic society, the zygote-as-person rationale is untenable in the extreme. 
. . . Abstract metaphysical speculation has its rightful place in theology; but it 
must finally be rejected as inappropriate to the logic necessary for democratic 
rule. 
Id. 
 57 There are, of course, exceptions. For example, Doris Gordon (Founder, 
Libertarians for Life) and Nat Hentoff (writer, THE VILLAGE VOICE) are pro-life atheists.  
As far as I know, it is Doris Gordon who coined the term “abortion-choice,” which I use in 
this essay and elsewhere.  See Doris Gordon, How I Became Pro-Life: Remarks on 
Abortion, Parental Obligation, and the Draft, 19 INT’L J. SOC.& SOC. POL’Y 14 (1999). 
 58 See, e.g., PATRICK LEE, ABORTION AND UNBORN HUMAN LIFE (1996); J. P. 
MORELAND & SCOTT B. RAE, BODY & SOUL: HUMAN NATURE & THE CRISIS IN ETHICS 
(2000); Francis J. Beckwith, The Explanatory Power of the Substance View of Persons, 
10.1 CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 33 (2004). 
 59 This is the stereotype advanced by Simmons when he writes that the pro-life view 
of the unborn’s intrinsic value is merely a claim of “Catholic dogma” and/or “special 
knowledge” that is neither “subject to critical analysis” nor rooted in “reason.”  Simmons, 
Religious Liberty and Abortion Policy, supra note 55, at 71-5. 
 60 Sophisticated pro-life advocates typically argue from the nature of the unborn in 
order to establish its standing as a rights-bearer who ought to be protected by our laws.  
This type of argument is meant to rebut the typical abortion-choice argument that 
equates a human being’s intrinsic value with whether it has the present ability to exercise 
or exhibit certain functions, e.g., consciousness, self-awareness, ability to communicate, or 
having a self-concept.  See, e.g., DAVID BOONIN, A DEFENSE OF ABORTION (2002); Dean 
Stretton, The Fallacy of Essential Moral Personhood, at http://www.pcug.org.au/~dean/fe 
mp.html (last visited May 1, 2003) [hereinafter Stretton, Fallacy]; MICHAEL TOOLEY, 
ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE (1983).  In a nutshell, pro-lifers respond to this sort of 
argument by arguing that there is a deep connection between our human nature and the 
rights that spring from it, which a just government is obligated recognize. The unborn – 
from zygote to blastocyst to embryo to fetus – is the same being, the same substance, that 
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uncritically from a religious text or from the pronouncements of a 
religious authority.  On the contrary, they are fully accessible to 
a wide range of people, even those who dispute their veracity 
and/or the conclusion for which they are conscripted. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that supporters of abortion-
choice rebut the pro-life case by offering their own philosophical 
anthropology.  That is, they present arguments to show that the 
unborn, though a human being, does not possess the requisite 
characteristics that would require the government to protect it as 
a subject of rights.61 
Both the pro-life proponent and the abortion-choice advocate 
offer contrary accounts of the same being – the unborn.  The 
former offers a view of the human person that is at home in a 
religious worldview, though it is certainly not unreasonable to 
accept the pro-life position while rejecting the religious tradition 
from which it sprang.62  On the other hand, the abortion-choice 
advocate offers an explanation of the human person that denies 
the soundness of the pro-life position.  The abortion-choice 
position is widely held by citizens who are secular in their 
worldview and harbor an antipathy to the influence of traditional 
religion on public life.63 
 
develops into an adult.  The actualization of a human being’s potential, e.g. her “human” 
appearance and the exercise of her rational and moral powers as an adult (which 
abortion-choice advocates argue determine the unborn’s intrinsic value), is merely the 
public presentation of functions latent in every human substance from the moment it is 
brought into being.  A human may lose and regain those functions throughout her life, but 
the substance remains the same being.  Moreover, if one’s value is conditioned on certain 
accidental properties then the human equality presupposed by our legal institutions and 
our form of government – the philosophical foundation of our constitutional regime – is a 
fiction.  In that case, there is no principled basis for rejecting the notion that human 
rights ought to be distributed to individuals on the basis of native intellectual abilities or 
other value-giving properties, such as rationality or self-awareness.  One can only reject 
this notion by affirming that human beings are intrinsically valuable because they 
possess a particular nature from the moment they come into existence.  That is to say, 
what a human being is, and not what she does, makes her a subject of rights. 
 61 See BOONIN, supra note 60; Stretton, Fallacy, supra note 60; TOOLEY, supra note 
60. 
 62 See supra note 57, 60. 
 63 For example, the number of organizations and individuals that own websites that 
advance a secular worldview while supporting church-state separation and the abortion-
choice position are nearly limitless.  See, e.g., Internet Infidels Discussion Forum, at 
http://www.iidb.org/vbb/archive/index.php/t-79887 (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) (“Delaware 
Valley Chapter of Americans United for Separation of Church and State President Janice 
Rael has details on carpools and buses to the March for Women’s Lives from 
everywhere.”); Debra Arias, A Close Encounter With the Religious Right, Separation of 
Church and State Home Page, at http://candst.tripod.com/tnppage/debbie.htm (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2005) (“I did what I could to support pro-choice . . . because this was the only area 
of my life that I felt the radical right threatened.  I was wrong.”); AU Joins ‘March for 
Women’s Lives’ - Sunday, April 25 , The Wall of Separation: Official Weblog of Au.org, at 
http://blog.au.org/2004/04/march_for_women.html (Apr. 20, 2004) (“We encourage all AU 
activists to join us in marching behind our church-state separation banner.  AU Executive 
Director Barry Lynn will be one of the featured speakers at the rally.”); The Affirmations 
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Thus, both the pro-lifer and the abortion-choice advocate 
present divergent answers to the same question: Who and what 
are we? Yet, according to the separationist, only the pro-lifer is 
forbidden from shaping public policy because her point of view is 
“[a]bstract metaphysical speculation [that] has its rightful place 
in theology; but it must finally be rejected as inappropriate to the 
logic necessary for democratic rule.”64  But the abortion-choice 
advocate attempts to justify his position by offering what is 
essentially a different metaphysical account, e.g. one that picks 
out certain presently exercisable abilities or functions that a 
being must have in order to be afforded the protections of our 
laws.  There seems to be no good reason, except a type of crass 
philosophical apartheid, which would justify the latter account 
having a rightful place in politics and law, while its pro-life 
alternative is relegated to “its rightful place in theology.”65 
The interpretation of anti-establishment as the equivalent of 
a total separation of religion from our political and legal 
institutions has resulted in this unjustified public 
marginalization of citizens who have a religious understanding of 
certain political and moral issues.  As Hamburger and others 
point out, traditional dissenters such as the Danbury Baptists, 
did not understand anti-establishment in this way, and neither 
should we.66  The courts should not be in the business of siding 
with a militant secularism that seeks to have its metaphysics 
and morals firmly embedded in our laws while suggesting that 
the metaphysics and morals of its religious opponents, regardless 
of the quality of the arguments offered, should not even be 
considered by the citizenry simply because they flow from a 
religious worldview.  If liberal democracy means anything, it 
should at least mean that all citizens – regardless of the religious 
or non-religious source of their policy proposals – should be 
allowed to offer their best arguments without first being required 
by the courts or mischievous secularists to undergo a 
metaphysical litmus test.67 
 
 
of Humanism: A Statement of Principles, Council for Secular Humanism, at 
http://www.secularhumanism.org/intro/affirmations.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) 
(“Mature adults should be allowed to fulfill their aspirations, to express their sexual 
preferences, to exercise reproductive freedom . . . .”). 
 64 Simmons, Religious Liberty and Abortion Policy, supra note 55, at 75. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See HAMBURGER, supra note 11, at 163-80. 
 67 For an extended defense of a similar point of view, see Nicholas Wolterstorff’s 
contribution to ROBERT AUDI & NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC 
SQUARE: THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN POLITICAL DEBATE (1997). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Hamburger’s book is an important work of compelling 
scholarship, and its content is much richer than I can possibly 
begin to convey in this brief review essay.  Although it is difficult 
to predict the Court’s future trajectory in religion-clause 
jurisprudence, there is little doubt that Hamburger’s book and its 
conclusions, will, and ought to, play a major part in directing that 
trajectory.  In his conclusion, Hamburger writes that 
“Americans . . . gradually forgot the character of their older, 
antiestablishment religious liberty and eventually came to 
understand their religious freedom as a separation of church and 
state.”68  Thus, despite this view’s widespread acceptance, it lacks 
constitutional authority.  For this reason and because of its roots 
in prejudice, “the idea of separation should, at best, be viewed 
with suspicion.”69 
Separation of Church and State has, of course, ruffled some 
feathers, as do all great books that seek to critically assess beliefs 
that once seemed like permanent fixtures of the canon of 
conventional wisdom.70  Although it is a hard pill for some to 
 
 68 HAMBURGER, supra note 11, at 492. 
 69 Id. at 483. 
 70 See, e.g., J. Brent Walker, Hamburger wrong about founders’ early Baptists’ view 
of separation, Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, at 
http://www.bjcpa.org/Pages/Views/2002/08.07reflections.html (Aug. 7, 2002) [hereinafter 
Walker, Hamburger Wrong].  Walker concludes his review by charging Hamburger with 
historical revisionism.  Id.  Yet, in his attempt to rebut Hamburger’s claim that church-
state separation harms religious liberty, Walker offers an argument that is terribly 
misleading: 
Moreover, the separation of church and state serves both religion clauses in the 
First Amendment.  It operates not only to insist upon non-establishment, but 
also to ensure the free exercise of religion.  In fact, the Supreme Court’s first 
use of the words “separation of church and state” came in a free exercise case 
in 1879. 
Id.  But what Walker does not tell his readers is that the 1879 case to which he refers, 
Reynolds v. United States, involved a federal statute that prohibited Mormon polygamy 
and that the Court ruled in favor of the government and rejected the Mormon Free 
Exercise claim.  98 U.S. 145, 166-8.  The Mormons were free to believe in polygamy, but 
they could not exercise it (which, I suspect, is the point of the practice). The Reynolds 
Court writes: 
In our opinion, the statute immediately under consideration is within the 
legislative power of Congress. It is constitutional and valid as prescribing a 
rule of action for all those residing in the Territories, and in places over which 
the United States have exclusive control.  This being so, the only question 
which remains is, whether those who make polygamy a part of their religion 
are excepted from the operation of the statute.  If they are, then those who do 
not make polygamy a part of their religious belief may be found guilty and 
punished, while those who do, must be acquitted and go free.  This would be 
introducing a new element into criminal law.  Laws are made for the 
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious 
belief and opinions, they may with practices.  Suppose one believed that 
human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be 
seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not 
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swallow, especially those who have linked the veracity of their 
theological tradition to separationism,71 integrity demands that 
those individuals begin to rethink and re-adjust their 
understanding of First Amendment jurisprudence to fit the facts.  
Perhaps it is time to take the advice of Jefferson’s predecessor, 
John Adams:  “Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be 
our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they 
cannot alter the state of facts and evidence[.]”72 
 
 
interfere to prevent a sacrifice?  Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty 
to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond 
the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into 
practice? 
Id. at 166. 
  The Reynolds opinion, which Walker cites as supporting his position, does not 
seem to square well with his embracing of the peculiar Baptist doctrine of “soul freedom.”  
Walker, Hamburger Wrong, supra.  Elsewhere on the same website where Walker’s 
article appears, Walter B. Shurden hashes out a meaning of “soul freedom” that would 
seem to require that the Court permit polygamy between three or more consenting “souls.” 
Walter B. Shurden, How We Got That Way Baptists on Religious Liberty and the 
Separation of Church and State, Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, at 
http://www.bjcpa.org/Pages/ Resources/Pubs/shurden.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). 
 71 For example, the Baptist scholar James Dunn writes: 
I contend that there is a Baptist identity.  There are Baptist spots on our herd 
and you can tell them from the others. . . So, without those spots you may be a 
wonderful person, maybe a devout and dedicated Christian, far closer to the 
Jesus model than I may ever be, but frankly, my dear, you are not a Baptist.  I 
personally and passionately believe that Baptist Christians are an identifiable 
breed.  One of our marks is separation of church and state.  There is no doubt 
that there is an unbroken chain in our “baptist bonafides” from soul freedom to 
religious liberty to the separation of church and state, all part of the package. 
Thank God Texas Baptists are not among those so-called, semi, pseudo anti-
Baptists who have turned away from our blood-bought heritage. 
James Dunn, Religious Liberty as a Baptist Distinctive, 7 JOURNAL OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 
(Apr. 2001), at http://www.christianethicstoday.com/Issue/033/Religious%20Liberty% 
20as%20a%20Bapti st%20Distinctive%20By%20James%20Dunn_033_3_.htm.  Although 
Dunn’s account of Baptist doctrine may sound like the description of an essential belief or 
something that one would find in a creed, elsewhere Dunn denies that Baptists embrace 
creeds.  Ken Woodward quotes Dunn as saying: “The only Baptist creedis ‘Ain’t nobody 
but Jesus goin’ to tell me what to believe.’”  Ken Woodward, Sex, Sin, and Salvation, 
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 2, 1998, at 37. 
 72 John Adams, 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 98, 269 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller 
B. Zobel  eds., 1965). 
